Mahrenholz v county board

Sign In to view the Rule of Law and Holding. Its resolution depends on the judicial construction of language in a conveyance of that property.

The case is before us on the pleadings, plaintiffs' third amended complaint having been dismissed by a final order. The pertinent facts are taken from the pleadings.

MAHRENHOLZ v. CO. BD. OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES

On March 18,W. The deed provided that "this land to be used for school purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein. Hutton died intestate on July 18,and Jennie Hutton died intestate on February 18, The Huttons left as their only legal heir their son Harry E. The property conveyed by the Huttons became the site of the Hutton School. Community Unit School District No. After that date, children were transported to classes held at other facilities operated by the District.

The District has used the property since then for storage purposes only. Earl and Madeline Jacqmain executed a warranty deed on October 9,conveying to the plaintiffs over acres of land in Lawrence County and which included the acre tract from which the Hutton School grounds were taken. When and from whom the Jacqmains acquired the land is not shown and is of no consequence in this appeal.

The deed from the Jacqmains to the plaintiffs excepted the Hutton School grounds, but purported to convey the disputed future interest, with the following language:. On May 7,Harry E.

Hutton, son and sole heir of W. This document was filed in the recorder's office of Lawrence County on September 7, On September 6,Harry Hutton disclaimed his interest in the property in favor of the defendants. The disclaimer was in the form of a written document entitled "Disclaimer and Release. Hutton disclaimed and released any possibility of reverter or right of entry for condition broken, or other similar interest, in favor of the County Board of School Trustees for Lawrence County, Illinois, successor to the Trustees of School District No.

The document further recited that it was made for the purpose of releasing and extinguishing any right Harry E.CourtListener is a project of Free Law Projecta federally-recognized c 3 non-profit. We rely on donations for our financial security. Donate Now. Sign In Register.

Filed: January 29th, Precedential Status: Precedential. Citations: N. Docket Number: Author: Charles Jones. Cunningham, and Wanda Ellen Wakefield, of Lawrenceville, for appellants.

John F. This case involves an action to quiet title to real property located in Lawrence County, Illinois. Its resolution depends on the judicial construction of language in a conveyance of that property.

The case is before us on the pleadings, plaintiffs' third amended complaint having been dismissed by a final order. The pertinent facts are taken from the pleadings.

mahrenholz v county board

On March 18,W. The deed provided that "this land to be used for school purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein. Hutton died intestate on July 18,and Jennie Hutton died intestate on February 18, The Huttons left as their only legal heir their son Harry E.

The property conveyed by the Huttons became the site of the Hutton School.

mahrenholz v county board

Community Unit School District No. After that date, children were transported to classes held at other facilities operated by the District. The District has used the property since then for storage purposes only. Earl and Madeline Jacqmain executed a warranty deed on October 9,conveying to the plaintiffs over acres of land in Lawrence County and which included the acre tract from which the Hutton School grounds were taken.

When and from whom the Jacqmains acquired the land is not shown and is of no consequence in this appeal.

mahrenholz v county board

The deed from the Jacqmains to the plaintiffs excepted the Hutton School grounds, but purported to convey the disputed future interest, with the following language:. On May 7,Harry E. Hutton, son and sole heir of W. This document was filed in the recorder's office of Lawrence County on September 7, On September 6,Harry Hutton disclaimed his interest in the property in favor of the defendants. The disclaimer was in the form of a written document entitled "Disclaimer and Release.

Hutton disclaimed and released any possibility of reverter or right of entry for condition broken, or other similar interest, in favor of the County Board of School Trustees for Lawrence County, Illinois, successor to the Trustees of School District No. The document further recited that it was made for the purpose of releasing and extinguishing any right Harry E.

Hutton may have had in the "interest retained by W. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Lawrence County on April 9,in which they sought to quiet title to the school property in themselves, by virtue of the interests acquired from the Jacqmains.

Mahrenholz v. County Bd. of School Trustees of Lawrence County

This complaint was amended but later dismissed on defendants' motion. A second amended complaint was filed on September 7, Appellate Court of Illinois — Fifth District. Roscoe D. Cunningham and Wanda Ellen Wakefield, both of Lawrenceville, for appellants. John F. This case involves a action to quiet title to real property located in Lawrence County, Illinois.

This is the second time the case has been before this court. On the first occasion, plaintiffs, Herbert L. This court reversed and remanded. Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees93 Ill. On remand, the circuit court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs appeal. Defendants have filed no cross-appeal. The pertinent facts prior to this court's remandment of this cause are sufficiently stated in the opinion of this court and need be only briefly summarized.

According to the pleadings, the facts are as follows:. On March 18,W. The deed provided: "This land to be used for school purposes only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein. Hutton died intestate on July 18,and Jennie died intestate on February 18, Plaintiffs' pleadings allege that W. After that date, the district has used the property for storage purposes only; however, a dispute exists as to the nature of property stored there. By deed dated October 9,Earl and Madeline Jacqmain conveyed to plaintiffs over acres of land which include the acre tract from which the Hutton School grounds were taken.

This deed excepted the Hutton School grounds but purported to convey the disputed future interest, as follows:. Hutton conveyed to plaintiffs all of his interest in the Hutton School property. In a document dated September 6,and filed in the recorder's office on October 4,entitled "Disclaimer and Release," Harry E. Hutton disclaimed and released any possibility of reverter, right of entry for condition broken, or similar interest, in favor of defendant County Board of School Trustees.

This document recited that it was made for the purpose of releasing and extinguishing any right Harry E. Hutton may have had in the "interest retained by W. In the trial court's order of March 21,dismissing plaintiff's third amended complaint, the trial court concluded that the March 18,deed created a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent followed by the right of entry for condition broken, rather than a determinable fee followed by a possibility of reverter.

Plaintiff appealed, and this court reversed and remanded, concluding that what the grantors intended to create was a fee simple determinable followed by a possibility of reverter. The Illinois Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for leave to appeal. In further proceedings before the trial court, the parties pursued discovery and defendants answered plaintiffs' third amended complaint.Thinking of Dropping Out of Law School?

Law School Case Briefs. Saturday, December 28, Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees case brief. Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees case brief summary N.

The action was dismissed, and it was held that a fee simple conditional existed in the property and the plaintiff had not acquired an interest in school property. Posted by LawSchoolCaseBriefs. No comments:. Post a Comment. Newer Post Older Post Home. Subscribe to: Post Comments Atom. Search Thousands of Case Briefs and Articles.

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Privacy Policy.Appellate Court of Illinois — Fifth District. Roscoe D. Cunningham, Ltd. John F. They since have been before us twice prior to this appeal. See Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees93 Ill. County Board of School TrusteesIll. The controversy stems from the original conveyance of the land by W.

The Huttons then conveyed the adjoining farmland and their reversionary interest in the school site to the Jacqmains, who in turn conveyed their interest to plaintiffs in In May ofdefendants discontinued holding regular classes at Hutton School. The building, from that time on, has been used to warehouse and store miscellaneous school equipment and supplies, primarily unused desks. Plaintiffs filed suit in to quiet title to the school property in themselves on the basis of the interests acquired from the Jacqmains and from Harry E.

Hutton, who was then believed to be the son and sole heir of W. It was later determined Harry was in fact the stepson of Jennie Hutton, who survived her husband in joint tenancy. We ruled, however, in Mahrenholz I that the Huttons created a fee simple determinable followed by a possibility of reverter. While plaintiffs acquired no interest in the tract from the Jacqmains, we held they could have acquired an interest in the property from Harry Hutton Harry's true status being unknown at this time.

The litigation proceeded onward, resulting in a summary judgment for defendants on the basis the property was still being used for school purposes and had not reverted.

We reversed this decision in Mahrenholz II, finding that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the property actually was being used for a school purpose and whether plaintiffs were in possession of the premises.

Twelve years after the first complaint was filed, the case finally came on for trial. After several days of testimony, a view of the property, and extensive briefing of the parties, the trial court ruled plaintiffs failed to prove that they were in possession of the premises and that the site was no longer being used for school purposes, resulting in the instant appeal. Both parties raise numerous points on appeal, but we believe the determinative issue is whether the property is being used for school purposes.

It does not, however, require the actual holding of classes. La Salle National BankIll. The question then becomes whether storage of school property constitutes a legitimate "school purpose. School populations are not static. They change from year to year, and in some instances, from month to month. In order to accommodate such changes, storage facilities are necessary, not only to house surplus equipment and supplies when attendance is low to meet the needs when attendance is higher but also to replace worn out and damaged items.

Clearly, having such equipment and supplies on hand furthers the ultimate goal of educating students. This does not mean necessarily that all storage is for a school purpose.

While defendants claim their storage falls within the ambit of "school purpose," plaintiffs contend defendants are using the building for nothing more than a "dumping ground," a refuge for obsolete materials, while allowing the building to deteriorate. If plaintiffs' claims were true, we would be compelled to agree defendants' use of the building would not constitute "school purpose.

Plaintiffs presented considerable evidence as to the deteriorating condition of the building and the lack of value and use of much of the items "stored" inside. But, defendants also presented evidence of having spent substantial amounts of money to maintain the structure, particularly the roof, along with several examples of recent usage of some of the equipment.

For instance, defendants claim they have "cannibalized" certain stored equipment to repair "in use" items and plan to install a scoreboard formerly housed at Hutton in a nearby smaller gymnasium. We, sitting as a court of review, will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when faced with conflicts in the evidence and issues of the credibility of witnesses.

See, e. MontalbanoIll. This is particularly true in this instance when the trial judge, at plaintiffs' request, conducted a personal inspection and examination of the school and its contents. We agree with plaintiffs that defendants could have found more convenient storage facilities which were less expensive to maintain.Roscoe D. Cunningham, Ltd. John F. They since have been before us twice prior to this appeal. See Mahrenholz v.

County Board of School Trustees93 Ill. County Board of School TrusteesIll. The controversy stems from the original conveyance of the land by W. The Huttons then conveyed the adjoining farmland and their reversionary interest in the school site to the Jacqmains, who in turn conveyed their interest to plaintiffs in In May ofdefendants discontinued holding regular classes at Hutton School.

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The building, from that time on, has been used to warehouse and store miscellaneous school equipment and supplies, primarily unused desks. Plaintiffs filed suit in to quiet title to the school property in themselves on the basis of the interests acquired from the Jacqmains and from Harry E. Hutton, who was then believed to be the son and sole heir of W.

It was later determined Harry was in fact the stepson of Jennie Hutton, who survived her husband in joint tenancy. We ruled, however, in Mahrenholz I that the Huttons created a fee simple determinable followed by a possibility of reverter. While plaintiffs acquired no interest in the tract from the Jacqmains, we held they could have acquired an interest in the property from Harry Hutton Harry's true status being unknown at this time.

The litigation proceeded onward, resulting in a summary judgment for defendants on the basis the property was still being used for school purposes and had not reverted. We reversed this decision in Mahrenholz II, finding that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the property actually was being used for a school purpose and whether plaintiffs were in possession of the premises.

Twelve years after the first complaint was filed, the case finally came on for trial. After several days of testimony, a view of the property, and extensive briefing of the parties, the trial court ruled plaintiffs failed to prove that they were in possession of the premises and that the site was no longer being used for school purposes, resulting in the instant appeal.

Both parties raise numerous points on appeal, but we believe the determinative issue is whether the property is being used for school purposes. It does not, however, require the actual holding of classes. La Salle National BankIll. The question then becomes whether storage of school property constitutes a legitimate "school purpose. School populations are not static.Case summaries covering constitutional law, property law, contracts, torts, criminal law, and civil procedure. Under a FSD, the property automatically reverts to the grantor upon the failure of a required condition, and his future reversion interest becomes a fee simple absolute immediately.

School district stopped using property as a school and the future interests were transferred to another owner. Under a FSD, adverse possession can begin as soon as the condition has been broken, and thus the grantee of the property can retain interest later if the reversion is not claimed before the adverse possession runs. Under a FSSCS, adverse possession does not occur, because until the grantor attempts to re enter the property and claims it back, the property is not possessed adversely.

However, there is a statute of limitations that may run on the right to re-enter similar to the doctrine of laches. Case summaries providing snippets of the facts and holdings of frequently-taught law school cases. CaseSum Case Summaries for Law Students Case summaries covering constitutional law, property law, contracts, torts, criminal law, and civil procedure.

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